Wyndham Hotels \& Resorts Rejects Choice Hotels Unsolicited Offer

## Wyndham Hotels \& Resorts Overview

Largest hotel franchisor worldwide ${ }^{(a)}$

Leading brands in the resilient select-service segment

Asset-light business model generating significant free cash flow

Primarily leisure-focused, "drive to" portfolio of hotels

$$
\begin{array}{cccc}
\begin{array}{c}
\sim 9,100 \\
\text { Hotels }
\end{array} & \begin{array}{c}
24 \\
\text { Brands }
\end{array} & \begin{array}{c}
\sim 237,000 \\
\text { Rooms in the } \\
\text { Pipeline }
\end{array} & \begin{array}{c}
\sim 70 \% \\
\text { Leisure Guest Mix }
\end{array} \\
\sim \begin{array}{c}
\sim 858,000 \\
\text { Current Rooms }
\end{array} & \begin{array}{c}
95+ \\
\text { Countries }
\end{array} & \begin{array}{c}
\sim 105 \mathrm{M}
\end{array} & \sim 90 \% \\
\text { Loyalty Members }
\end{array} \quad \text { Drive to Destinations }
$$

# Wyndham Has Built the Foundation for Long-Term, Sustainable Growth 

## Actions

## Evolution Since Spin(a)

- Simplified, asset-light franchising business model with strong Adj. EBITDA margin and high free cash flow conversion
- Maintained a strong balance sheet and consistently returned capital to shareholders
- Drove organic growth and increased exposure in high RevPAR international markets
- Developed new market entry products to underserved segments and investments to capture growing infrastructure business
- Cultivated franchisee relationships through owner-first mentality and making hotel travel possible for all

|  | 11 <br> Consecutive quarters of organic net room growth | 13 <br> Consecutive quarters of pipeline growth |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 4 <br> New brands targeting attractive segments | 265 <br> ECHO Suites deals signed fastes growing extended stay brand |
|  | $200+b p s$ <br> Retention rate improvement | ~105 million <br> Wyndham Rewards members |

## Choice's Proposal is Not in the Best Interest of Wyndham Shareholders

Wyndham's standalone plan provides a more compelling risk-adjusted return compared to Choice's unsolicited offer

## Uncertain Regulatory Timeline and Outcome Presents Vastly Asymmetrical Risk for Wyndham Shareholders without Appropriate Protections and Compensation

Choice's Offer Exploits Timing and Undervalues Wyndham's Superior,
Standalone Growth Prospects

Choice's Slower-Growing Business and Post-Transaction, Higher Leverage Negatively Affects Equity Consideration


## Regulatory Clearance Timeline is Protracted and Outcome is Uncertain

Subject matter experts on both sides have acknowledged the combination would be subject to FTC second round review, which typically takes 12 to 18 months


Wyndham shareholders bear asymmetrical risk of business disruption during long period of uncertainty
Despite multiple requests, Choice has not offered solutions to address the significant risks posed to Wyndham and its shareholders

Franchisees Are Concerned About Losing Wyndham's Owner-First Philosophy

Choice Hotels would care less about franchisees' profit. They're solely focused on profits for themselves. In my 25 years with Choice, it was rare to non-existent to have a relationship with senior leadership." Super 8 owner

I was supposed to break ground on a new Hawthorn and immediately put it to a halt because I want to know I am doing business with Wyndham, a company where I am family and not a number." La Quinta and Hawthorn multi-unit owner

Wyndham's owner-first approach starts at the very top and is lived by the entire organization. That's why we're focusing our new development effort with Wyndham and the Echo Suites brand, which will bring us much future success."
Echo developer


## Prolonged Transaction Process Poses Business Disruption Risk

Wyndham's Board believes there is potential for irreparable damage to our business and erosion of shareholder value

Risks to Wyndham Shareholders During 12-to-18 month Regulatory Review Period

- Earnings growth impaired due to new business development disruption and lower materialization of current pipeline
- ECHO Suites by Wyndham development stagnates from developer unwillingness to move forward under Choice ownership
- Ability to attract and retain premium talent in a tight labor market jeopardizing long-term growth prospects
- Competitors capitalizing on franchisee uncertainty impacting continued momentum in retention rate and new development


## Potential Risks to Wyndham Shareholders are Meaningful

Wyndham's ability to execute on its growth pillars may be hindered, negatively impacting both standalone and pro forma valuation


[^0]
## Choice's Proposal Exploits Timing

Choice's offer is an opportunistic attempt to take advantage of point-in-time stock price fluctuations resulting in a favorable exchange ratio to Choice

Most Favorable Exchange Ratio in Two Years
Choice takes advantage of point-in-time stock price fluctuations with offers coming at the most opportunistic times


Offer Does Not Represent Appropriate Valuation
Choice's latest offer represents a mere 6\% premium to Wyndham's 52-week high, taking advantage of a temporary dislocation in share price


## Industry Research Analysts Overwhelmingly Believe Wyndham is Undervalued and has Significant Upside

Wyndham stock was trading at a $25 \%$ discount to its average price target vs. Choice's $3 \%$ discount; 12 of 13 covering analysts rate Wyndham stock as a "buy" vs. only 3 of 14 for Choice stock


## Wyndham's Proven Track Record of Delivering Results

Wyndham Has Outpaced Choice in Organic Room Growth

Actual Adj. Diluted EPS vs Consensus Analyst Estimates by Quarter and Year (Beat, Miss)

1 Wyndham has delivered organic net room growth and beat consensus
EPS estimates for 11 consecutive quarters

## Wyndham Continues Strong Track Record of Growth

Multiple Levers to Drive Net Room Growth

| ORGANIC NET |
| :---: |
| ROOM GROWTH |
| Longer | Proven Value Proposition

## Wyndham Poised to Accelerate Growth . . .

## 2024 Adjusted EBITDA Outlook ${ }^{(a)}$



2023E
2024E

Incremental Growth Opportunities in the Medium-term
$\checkmark$ Platform investment to capitalize on \$1.5T U.S. infrastructure bill
$\checkmark$ Continued occupancy recovery to pre-pandemic levels
$\checkmark$ RevPAR accretion from our 70\% midscale+ pipeline
$\checkmark$ Improvement in our global retention rate to 96\%+
$\checkmark$ New earnings stream from ECHO Suites hotel openings
$\checkmark$ Improvements in regional royalty rates
$\checkmark$ Ancillary revenue opportunities
Growth

## And Capital Deployment Will Further Enhance Growth

Cash Available for Capital Allocation(a)


3
Choice's Slower-Growing Business and Post-Transaction, Higher Leverage Negatively Affects Equity Consideration

## Wyndham Shareholders Exposed to Slower-Growth Choice Business

|  |  | Wyndham | Choice |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 0$\stackrel{0}{C}$00000 | Number of rooms | 851,500 | 628,901 |
|  | Q2 '23 TTM RevPAR (US) | \$51.08 | \$55.31 |
|  | 2023E RevPAR growth (company guidance) | 4\%-6\% | $\sim 2 \%{ }^{(a)}$ |
|  | Q2 '23 YoY organic global net room growth | 3\% | (2\%) ${ }^{(b)}$ |
|  | Q2 '21-Q2 '23 organic global net room growth CAGR ${ }^{(c)}$ | 3\% | (3\%) |
|  | 2023E organic net room growth (company guidance) | 2\%-4\% | $\sim 1 \%{ }^{(d)}$ |
|  | Pipeline (\# of rooms) / \% of the system / YTD growth | 228,000 / 27\% / 4\% | 93,646 / 15\% / (12\%) |
|  | 1H '23 organic Adj. EBITDA growth ${ }^{(e)}$ | 9\% | 1\% |
|  | 1H '23 organic Adj. EBITDA margin ${ }^{(e)}$ | 81\% | 73\% |
|  | 1H '23 free cash flow conversion ${ }^{(f)}$ | 102\% | 54\% |
|  | Net debt / LTM Adj. EBITDA ${ }^{(\mathrm{g})}$ | $3.2 x$ | $2.6 x$ |

Wyndham organic net room growth outperforms Choice

Wyndham's pipeline expanded 4\% YTD representing 13 consecutive quarters of growth, while Choice's pipeline contracted $12 \%$Wyndham has significantly higher free cash flow conversion
(3) Equity Consideration Risk

## Choice's Future Growth is also Challenged Given a Declining Pipeline




Choice's Global and U.S. Pipeline
(by Number of Rooms)


## Can Choice Maintain its Multiple Despite Lower Growth?

## Excessive Leverage with Long Deleveraging Period During Which ...

Choice would need to raise $\sim \$ 6$ billion total debt, including $\sim \$ 4$ billion incremental debt, in a historically high interest rate environment



## Equity Consideration Risk

## . . . Choice Could No Longer Rely on its Balance Sheet to Fund Growth

Significant capital deployment drove both Choice's organic and inorganic growth historically; Organic growth turned negative when capital deployment was curtailed



## Choice's Mischaracterization of Their Unsolicited Proposal

| Choice Fiction | Fact |
| :---: | :---: |
| Parties were in Advanced Negotiations | With every approach, our significant concerns with Choice's unsolicited offer were dismissed, ignored or unsatisfactorily addressed <br> $\checkmark$ As a result, there was never engagement on substantive terms, including valuation or diligence |
| Alignment on NDA and Information Requests | Choice was unwilling, from their first offer, to sign a customary mutual non-disclosure agreement allowing diligence for a transaction of this nature <br> $\checkmark$ The documents Choice was prepared to provide under a one-way NDA were comprised mostly of publicly available information, and did not include materials to address our concerns over lack of organic growth |
| Clear Path to Completion | $\checkmark$ Until September, Choice asserted the regulatory process was likely to be resolved in 60 days <br> $\checkmark$ After discussions with Wyndham's advisors, Choice's advisors also acknowledged the high likelihood of a second request, which typically takes 12-18 months <br> Choice's suggested "market standard protections" are not commensurate with the asymmetrical risk |
| Broadly Supported by Franchisees | $\checkmark$ AAHOA, the owner association representing two-thirds of both Wyndham and Choice franchisees, described the potential combination as having "frightening" consequences for franchisees <br> $\checkmark$ Franchisees have expressed significant concerns about losing Wyndham's owner-first philosophy |
| \$1B Pro Forma Free Cash Flow in 2024 | $\checkmark$ Appears to ignore: 1) timing and upfront cost to realize synergies, 2) \$300+ million interest expense on new debt, and 3) potential business disruption and dis-synergies <br> $\checkmark$ Resulting lower free cash flow will constrain deleveraging and growth |

## What is the True Value of the Offer?

Choice's offer lacks protections for our shareholders and is subject to an extended regulatory timeline, market volatility impacting Choice's equity, and business and execution risks to Wyndham shareholders

## Transaction Timing

$\star$
Offer lacks protections and compensation for an extended regulatory review process of 12 to 18 months

Wyndham's ability to execute on its growth pillars may be disrupted, impacting standalone and pro forma valuation

## Choice's Equity Value During Review Period

Offer value remains uncertain and subject to Choice's share price volatility, including potential declines

Choice's interim earnings and capital allocation during review period could be pressured

## Pro Forma Company Value

Offer is contingent on equity consideration in a highly-leveraged and capital constrained company

Franchisees' concerns regarding loss of our owner-first philosophy could create further dissynergies that affect pro forma valuation

## Proposal Inadequately Addresses Our Board's Key Concerns

Choice's offer has NOT satisfactorily solved for the following concerns:

Necessary protections and value for Wyndham shareholders to compensate for a prolonged and uncertain regulatory process

Appropriate value and premium for our business reflecting our strong, long-term growth prospects as a standalone company

Transaction consideration mix that does not expose Wyndham to Choice's share price volatility pre-transaction closing and a constrained balance sheet post-transaction closing

## WYNDHAM

HOTELS \& RESORTS

Appendix

## 2024 Planning - Revenue Sensitivities

## Adjusted EBITDA Sensitivities (in millions)

1 point of RevPAR/Net Room Growth change vs. 2023

| U.S. royalties and franchise fees | ~\$3.4 | Margin of $\sim 85 \%$ on gross $\$ 4.9$ million per point |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | Margin of $\sim 85 \%$ on gross $\$ 4.9$ million per point impact; assumes cost mitigation of $\sim 15 \%$ |
| International royalties and franchise fees | ~\$0.8 |  |
| Marketing, reservation and loyalty fees | -- | Funds expected to break-even until RevPAR declines in excess of $\sim 10 \%$ (likely $\sim \$ 2.4$ million per point) |
| Non-RevPAR vs. 2023 |  |  |
| 1 point change in license fees | ~\$1.0 | Not RevPAR-based but is sensitive to overall travel demand; subject to a $\$ 70$ million floor |
| 1 point change in other revenue | ~\$1.0 | Not RevPAR-based but is somewhat sensitive to overall travel demand; predominately represents fee-based revenues from ancillary services provided to franchisees, including procurement and technology, as well as revenue associated with our co-branded credit card program |

## Long-Term Growth Opportunity

| Rooms growth | Impact on <br> Adj. EBITDA |
| :--- | :---: |
| RevPAR growth | $3-5 \%$ |
| Scale/ancillary | $2-3 \%$ |
| Growth initiatives | $0-1 \%$ |
| Long-term Adj. EBITDA growth potential before <br> excess free cash and leverage capacity | $\sim 2 \%$ |

## Footnotes

Page
Data is approximated as of September 30, 2023.
(a) Largest hotel franchisor by number of hotels.

Page 3
Note: Market data as of $10 / 20 / 23$.
Source: Capital IQ, Company Filings.
(b) Repremam spin-off date as of 05/31/2018
(b) Represents FY 2022 margin. Calculation excludes the impact of cost reimbursement and marketing reservation and loyalty fees,
(d) LTM leverage as of 9/30/23. Weighted average cost of debt for Q3 2023.

## Page 11

Note: Unaffected exchange ratio as of 10/16/2023.
Source: Capital IQ, Wall Street Research.
0.324 Choice shares per Wyndham share

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Note: Data as of $10 / 23 / 2023$.
Source: FactSet.

## Page 13

Note: Financial data as of 06/30/2023
Source: Company Filings, Capital IQ.
Page 14
Note: 2023 reflects the midpoint of our full-year 2-4\% NRG outlook.

Page 15
(a) 2023 to 2024 organic growth rates adjusted for $\$ 10$ million marketing fund contribution in 2023.

Page 16
(a) Represents an assumed 2024 year-end excess cash available for capital allocation
(b) Free cash flow excludes development advance notes.
(c) Assumes the midpoint of Wyndham's target net leverage of $3-4 x$ based on midpoint of 2024E EBITDA guidanc
(d) Assumes the midpoint of $\$ 700$ - $\$ 750$ million and fully diluted share count as 06/30/2023

Note: Financial data as of 06/30/2023. Wyndham outlook as of $10 / 25 / 2023$.
Source: Company Filings
(a) Represents domestic segment only
(c) Choice Q2 2023 global room count adjusted to exclude the $\sim 67 \mathrm{k}$ rooms acquired from Radisson.
(c) Wyndham room count is adjusted to exclude the $\sim 6.4 \mathrm{k}$ rooms acquired from Vienna House and Choice room count adjusted to exclude the $\sim 67 \mathrm{k}$ rooms acquired from Radisson.
(d) Represents domestic upscale, extended-stay and midscale segments.
(e) Normalizes results for both companies so that the impacts from marketing, reservation and loyalty funds
f) and owned hotels are on a comparable basis.
f) Calculated as net cash from operating activities less capital expenditures as a percentage of Adjusted Net Income.
(g) Reflects data as of 06/30/2023

## Page 19

Source: Company Filings
(a) Defined as brands having RevPAR higher than the system-wide RevPAR as of 2022. Includes Comfort, Ascend Hotel Collection, Sleep Inn, MainStay Suites and Cambria Hotel

## Page 20

Source: Capital IQ, Company Filings.
(a) Calculated by removing Radisson's pro rata share of EBITDA per management guidance for FY 2023 EBITDA from 1H 2023 EBITDA
b) Reflects year-on-year growth from 06/30/2022 to 06/30/2023.
(c) Reflects Yyear-to-date growth from 12/31/22 to 06/30/2023
(d) Represents 2024E Adj. EBITDA multiple for October 16, 2023 and 2022E Adj. EBITDA multiple for October 16, 2021 using most recently disclosed balance sheet data. Time period selected represents last quarter Choice had positive NRG

## Page 2

Note: Financial and balance sheet data as of 06/30/2023
Source: Company Filings, Capital IQ
(a) Reflects LTM net leverage as of 06/30/2023.
(b) 2023E net leverage based on Q2 2023 balance sheet data for WH and CHH with adjusted EBITDA based on 2023 consensus and assumes no synergies

Page 22
Note: Financial data as of 06/30/2023
Source: Company Filings
(a) Includes franchise agreement acquisition cost, development advance notes, issuance and collections of notes receivable, and M\&A

## Page 28

Note: Does not include potential bad debt impacts from uncollectible accounts, if any, in the event of a distressed environment, which cannot be predicted.

## Page 3

Note: Operating income margin excludes cost reimbursement revenues from calculation: FY 2022 calculation also excludes stub-period impact from the select-service management business and owned hotels.

## Non-GAAP Reconciliations

The following tables reconcile certain non-GAAP financial measures. The presentation of these adjustments is intended to permit the comparison of particular adjustments as they appear in the income statement in order to assist investors' understanding of the overall impact of such adjustments. We believe that adjusted EBITDA provides useful information to investors about us and our financial condition and results of operations because adjusted EBITDA is among the measures used by our management team to evaluate our operating performance and make day-to-day operating decisions and because adjusted EBITDA is frequently used by securities analysts, investors and other interested parties as a common performance measure to compare results or estimate valuations across companies in our industry. Explanations for adjustments within the reconciliations can be found in our third quarter 2023 Earnings Release at investor.wyndhamhotels.com.

|  | Nine Months Ended September 30, 2023 |  | Year Ended December 31, 2022 |  | Nine Months Ended September 30, 2022 |  | Year Ended <br> December 31, 2021 |  | Year Ended December 31, 2019 |  | Year Ended December 31, 2018 |  | Year Ended December 31, 2017 |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Net income | \$ | 240 | \$ | 355 | \$ | 299 | \$ | 244 | \$ | 157 | \$ | 162 | \$ | 230 |
| Provision for income taxes |  | 83 |  | 121 |  | 104 |  | 91 |  | 50 |  | 61 |  | 13 |
| Depreciation and amortization |  | 56 |  | 77 |  | 58 |  | 95 |  | 109 |  | 99 |  | 75 |
| Interest expense, net |  | 73 |  | 80 |  | 60 |  | 93 |  | 100 |  | 60 |  | 6 |
| Early extinguishmet of debt |  | 3 |  | 2 |  | 2 |  | 18 |  | - |  | - |  | - |
| Stock-based compensation |  | 28 |  | 33 |  | 25 |  | 28 |  | 15 |  | 9 |  | 11 |
| Development advance notes amortization |  | 11 |  | 12 |  | 9 |  | 11 |  | 8 |  | 7 |  | 6 |
| Transaction-related |  | 5 |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | 40 |  | 36 |  | 3 |
| Separation-related |  | - |  | 1 |  | - |  | 3 |  | 22 |  | 77 |  | 3 |
| Gain on asset sales |  | - |  | (35) |  | (35) |  |  |  | - |  | - |  |  |
| Impairment, net |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | 6 |  | 45 |  | - |  | 41 |
| Restructuring |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | 8 |  | - |  | 1 |
| Contract termination |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | 42 |  | - |  | - |
| Transaction-related item |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | 20 |  | - |  | - |
| Loss on asset sales |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |  | - |
| Foreign currency impact of highly inflationary countries |  | 6 |  | 4 |  | 2 |  | 1 |  | 5 |  | 3 |  | - |
| Adjusted EBITDA | \$ | 505 | \$ | 650 | \$ | 524 | \$ | 590 | \$ | 621 | \$ | 513 | \$ | 390 |

## Non-GAAP Reconciliations (continued)

|  |  | Nine Months Ended September 30, 2023 |  | Year Ended <br> December 31, 2022 |  | Year Ended <br> December 31, 2021 |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Net income |  | \$ | 240 | \$ | 355 | \$ | 244 |
| Adjustments: |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Gain on asset sale |  |  | - |  | (35) |  | - |
| Acquisition-related amortization exp |  |  | 20 |  | 31 |  | 38 |
| Transaction-related |  |  | 5 |  | - |  | - |
| Early extinguishment of debt |  |  | 3 |  | 2 |  | 18 |
| Impairments, net |  |  | - |  | - |  | 6 |
| Separation-related expenses |  |  | - |  | 1 |  | 3 |
| Foreign currency impact of highly in | ionary countries |  | 6 |  | 4 |  | 1 |
| Total adjustments before tax |  |  | 34 |  | 3 |  | 66 |
| Income tax provision |  |  | 8 |  | (2) |  | 13 |
| Total adjustments after tax |  |  | 26 |  | 5 |  | 53 |
| Adjusted net income |  | \$ | 266 | \$ | 360 | \$ | 297 |
|  | Year Ended December 31, 2022 | Year Ended December 31, 2019 |  | Year Ended December 31, 2018 |  | Year Ended December 31, 2017 |  |
| Operating income margin | 41\% |  | 21\% |  | 22\% |  | 25\% |
| Depreciation and amortization | 6\% |  | 8\% |  | 8\% |  | 7\% |
| Adjusted EBITDA adjustments per p. 46 | 1\% |  | 14\% |  | 10\% |  | 6\% |
| Marketing fund impact | 33\% |  | 29\% |  | 25\% |  | 22\% |
| Adjusted EBITDA margin | 81\% |  | 72\% |  | 65\% |  | 60\% |

## Definitions \& Disclaimer

## Definitions:





 companies, and in evaluating or making selected compensation decisions. The supplemental disclosures included in this presentation are in ad





## Disclaimer




 this presentation.
 Wyndham Hotels \& Resorts' Form 10-K, filed with the SEC on February 16, 2023 and subsequent reports filed with the SEC.
orward-Looking Statements



 update or revise any forward-looking statements, whether as a result of new information, subsequent events or otherwise, except as required by law.

Non-GAAP Financial Measures



 or more of these items have been applicable, such excluded items could be material, individually or in the aggregate, to the reported results.


[^0]:    Enhanced protections required to mitigate asymmetrical risk of not i ı realizing these cash flows and resulting impact to Wyndham shareholders I WYNDHAM

